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to be true of the principle as stated
in the syllabus to Miller v. Corn,
the corrected statement assumes
the creation of a mixed fund for the
general purposes of administration
and is inapplicable to the case of
money directed to be laid out in
land.
In conclusion, we submit, that if
a testator intends his realty to be
converted into personalty, out and
out, and for all purposes, so that the
proceeds are to be brought within the jurisdiction, and indiscriminately mingled with the general
residuary estate, and pass through
the executors' general accounts,

there would seem to be no sound
reason for exempting such property
from the burdens incident to other
,property within the jurisdiction,
and that common sense and sound
legal principle both justified JAMES,
L.J., in saying, in Forbes v. Steven, L. R., io Eq., i92: "It would
take a good deal more than I have
yet heard to satisfy me that a man
can with the same breath say effectually in this court, 'Give me the
money because it is residuary personal estate,' and declare it is not
taxable because it is not residuary
personal estate."
HOWARD W. PAGE.

EDITORIAL NOTES.
THE COURTS AND STRIKING RAILROAD
EMPLOYEES.
THE ANN ARBOR CASES.

IT is indeed fortunate for the country that as able a
judge as Judge TAFT should have had the opportunity to
expand the principles of equity to meet the growing
evil of the modem boycott. -Cases in which there has been
so much popular interest, as in that of Toledo, Ann Arbor
and North Michigan R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Company,
and in the case between the same parties, decided by Judge
RIcKs, are apt to be misunderstood; the confused notions
in the lay mind effecting the opinion of the cases entertained by the profession. Perhaps, therefore, we will serve
a useful purpose if we state, as shortly and clearly as may
be, the questions which the judges of the Sixth Circuit
were called upon to decide.
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The case -before Judge TAFT was that affecting Mr.
Arthur, the able head of the locomotive engineers. Mr.
Arthui had issued an order to the engineers -of the defendant railroad, which caused them to refuse to handle freight
passing to or from the Ann Arbor road. In short, he had
established a boycott against Ann Arbor freight. The
injunction was in the form of a command to rescind the
order and to permanently restrain him from issuing it
again.. It was a mandatory injunction.
What Mr. Arthur was about to do was a crime; made
so, if it was not already at the common law, by' express act
of Congress. A glance at the Interstate Commerce Law will
show this. The second paragraph of the third section of
the Act provides that "All common carriers subject to the
provisions of this Act shall, according to the provisions of
their respective powers, afford all reasoniable,. proper and
equal facilities for the interchange of traffic." Section io
makes any one who defeats any act fequired by the statute
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Besides being a crime, the act was a civil wrong to
the plaintiff company, for every crime involves 'a civil'
injury .to -those particularly affected. It is also a settled
principle of law that he who, with malice againstA, tries
to- induce B not to perform his obligation toward A, is
liable to A in an action of tort. That a continuance of the
boycott order threatened an irreparable injury to the Ann
Arbor road goes without saying.
At one time it might have been ,sfccessfully argued
that .the act of Arthur's, being primarily a crine,.could not
be restrained in equity. But, as wd pointed out in the
November number, 1892, in our note on "Injunctions to
Restrain Libels and Courts of Criminal Equity,I 'except in
a case of a libel, 'the fact that an act is a tort or crime will
-not prevefit, the court of equity from issuing an injunction
restraining the act, provided that the act threatens an irreparable damage' to property. The wisdom of this may
be questioned. As we said iii the note, if injunctions
'Vol. xxxr, p. 782.
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are to be issued in these cases, our legislatures should pass
acts to enable one charged with having broken the injunction by committing the crime, to have the fact determined
by a jury, with all the safeguards of formal trial.
The form of the injunction being mandatory,

.

e.,

ordering Mr. Arthur to rescind an order, while unusual, was
not without precedent. As long ago as the case of Robinson v. Lord Byron 1 an order was made restraining the poet
from not I"raising his dam heads so as the water will not'
escape as it will otherwise.'? There is also the case of
Lane v. Newgate,' where the defendant was restrained
" from further keeping a cannal out of repair," and numerous other cases.' The object of the injunction is to protect
property. This can usually be done, but not always, by an
injunction prohibitory in form. Sometimes the defendant,
as in this case, has done something, as issued an order, or
erected a wall, which is a continuing and irreparable injury
to the plaintiff. The Court will in such cases order that to
be rescinded which has already been done.
The case then, although rightly given great prominence in the public press, was one which contained
not one legal principle which was new to an American Court, though the opinion was remarkable 'for its
clearness.
Let us now turn to the decision of Judge Rics. The
Court in that case had previously issued an injunction
directed to the Pennsylvania Company, its servants and
employees, from cohltinuing to refuse to handle Ann Arbor
freight. The grounds were similar to those on which Judge
11 Bro.

Ch., 188.
io Ves., 192.
3 Beadle v. Perry R. R. Co., L. R., 3 Eq., 465; L. & N. W. R 1R. v.
T. & L. R. R., L. R., 4 Eq., 174, where the defendant was ordered to take
down a wall he had erected: Whitecar v. Michenor, 47 N.J. Eq., 6 (1883 ,;
Broome v. N.J. Tel. Co., 42 N.J., 141. The only difference between these
cases and the order issued by Judge TAFT was that in the cases cited the
irreparable injury was always committed on real property or against real
property, and the act was for the benefit of the person acting. These,
however, are distinctions which do not create fundamental differences.
The jurisdiction to issue the injunction rests on the irreparable injury
to property.
2
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TAFT granted the injunction against Mr.-Arthur.
As
explained, the injunction did not pretend to require any one
to' remain in the employ 6f the railr6ad, either the president
or any engineer. It only declared that any one who acted
for the company should not refuse to handle interstate freight.
Four engineers were charged with disobeying the order of
the Court. *As to three of these, the facts as assumed by
the Court were that they took their engines to the yards,
but abandoned them and quit the service of the company
when they were asked to haul cars for the Ann Arbor road.
This, it was held, was not disobedience of the injunction.
The injunction gave them their choice of quitting the
service of the railroad, or of carrying out the obligations of
the road to the Ann Arbor Company. In the. fourth- case
the Court held that an engineer who had run his engine to
the junction of the Ann Arbor road, and then refused to
haul an Ann Arbor car, had not resigned from the road, but
that his supposed resignation was a mere trick and device
to evade-the order' of the Court. Judge RICKS, therefore,
1
imposed a fine of fifty dollars-and costs.
The case 'isportentous of much further litigation
Judge, Rics, by his decision construed the injunction
he had issued to mean that all the employees of the comp ny Had, as we said, their choice of getting out, or hauling
Ann Arbor freight. This is, in itself, of considerable
importance; but in the course of his decision he raised a
'further question. of supreme interest. 'Can employees in
leaving do so suddenly and in 'a body?- In other words, is
a sudden strike of a large body of men legal? In answer

to this question and in speaking of the freedom of the
employees Judge RiCKs says: "But these relative rights

and powers of employer and employed may -become quite
different in the case of the employees of -a great public
corporation, charged by the law with certain great trusts
and duties to the public. An engineer and fireman, who
sta.rt from Toledo with a train of cars filled with passengers destined for Cleveland, begin that journey under
Did he not deprive him of his property -ithout due process of law?
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contract to drive their engine and draw the cars to the
destination agreed upon. Will it be claimed that this
engineer and fireman could quit their employment when
the train is part way on its route, and abandon it at
some point where the lives of the passengerq would be
imperiled and the safety of the property jeopardized?
The simple statement of the proposition carries its
own condemnation with it. The very nature of their
service, involving as it does the custody of human life and
the safety of millions of property, imposes upon them
obligations and duties commensurate with the character of
the trusts submitted to them. They represent a class of
skilled laborers, limited in number, whose places cannot
always be filled. The engineers on the Lake Shore
and M. S. R. R. operate steam engines moving over its
different divisions 25oo cars of freight per day. These
cars carry supplies and materials upon the delivery of
which the labor of tens of thousands of mechanics is
dependent. These cars carry the products of factories,
whose output must be speedily carried away to keep their
employees in labor. The suspension of work on the line
.of such a vast railroad, by the arbitrary action of the body
of its engineers and firemen, would paralyze the business
of the entire country, entailing losses and bringing disaster
to thousands of unoffending citizens. Contracts would be
broken, perishable property destroyed; the traveling public
embarrassed, injuries sustained too many and too vast to be
enumerated.
"All these evil results would follow to the public
because of the arbitrary action of a few hundred men, who
without any grievance of their own, without any dispute
with their own employer as to wages or hours of service, as
appears from the evidence in this case, quit their employment to aid men, it may be, on some road of minor importance, who have a difference with their employer which
they fail to settle by ordinary methods. If such ruin to
the business of employers and such disasters to thousands
of the business public who are helpless and innocent is the
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result of the conspiracy,, combination, intimidation, or
unlawful acts of.'organizations of employees, the courts have
the power to grant partial relief at least by restraining
employees from acts of commission, of violence or intimidaStion, or from enforcing rules and regulations of organizations which result in irremediable injuries to their emJudge TAFTr says to the
ployers and to the public."
same -effect, though he elsewhere draws a distinction
between strikes for a lawful and for in unlawful purpose:
"But it is said that it cannot be unlawful for an emfployee
either to threaten to quit or actually to quit the service
when not in violation of his contract, -because, a man
has the inalienable right to bestow his labor where he will,
and to viithhold his labor as he, will..' Generally speaking
this'is true, but not absolutely. If he uses the benefit
which his labor is or will be to another, by threatening to
withhold it, or agreeing to bestow it, or -by actually withholding it or bestowing it for the purpose of inducing,,pro,.curing or'compelling that other to commit an unlawful-or*
'criminal act, the withholding or bestowing his lab6r for such
a purpose is itself an unlawful and criminal act. The same
think is true with regard to' the exercise of the right of
property. A man has the right.to give or sell his property
where, he will, but if he give or sell' it, or refuse to give or
sell it, as a means of inducing or compelling, another ot
commit an unlawful act, his giving or selling it, or refusal
to do so, is itself unlawful."
- The learned jurists here recognize the fact that an
act which was only a civil wrong to the 'employer,, when
industry was not so interdependent as it is now, may
-become in altered industrial conditions a wrong to society.
"An act," says Judge RIcKs, "when done by.an individual
in the exercise of a right may be .lawful, but *hen done by
a number conspiring to injure or improperly influence
another may be unlawful. One or more *employees may
lawfully quit their employer's service at will; but a combination of a number of them to do so for the. purpose of
injuring the public and oppressing 'employees by unjustly
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subjecting them to the power of the confederates for
extortion, or for mischief, is criminal."' Whether an
injunction can be used to restrain such sudden strikes
is a question concerning which there seems to be some
difference of opinion between the two Judges. Judge
RIcKs says: "It is not necessary for the purposes of this
case to undertake to define with greater certainty the exact
relief which such cases may properly invoke; but that the
necessities growing, out of the vast and rapidly multiplying'
interests following our extending railway business make new
and correspondingly efficient measures for relief essential is
evident, and the courts, in the exercise of their . equity
jurisprudence, must meet the emergencies as far as possible
within the limits of existing laws, until needed additional.
legislation can be secured." On the other hand, we find
Judge TAFT, saying: "They may avoid or evade obedience
to the injunction by actually ceasing to be employees of the
company. Otherwise the injunction is in effect an rder on
them to remain -in the service of the company, and no such
order was ever, so far as the authorities show, issued by a
court of equity. It is true that if they quit the service of
the company in order to procure or compel defendant corn-'
panies to injure the complainant company, they are doing
an unlawful act, rendering themselves liable in damages to
the complainant if any injury is thereby inflicted, and that
they may be incurring a criminal penalty as already
,explained, but no matter how inadequate the remedy at law,
the arm of a court of equity cannot be extended by mandatory injunction to compel the performance of a contract for
personal service as against either the employer or the
employed."'
Judge RIcKs may thitik that the act of leaving under
certain circumstances may amount to a wrong sufficiently
great to warrant an injunction against such action. Judge
TAFT distinguishes between the case where the purpose
I Citing Stocker v. Borckenbank, 3 Mac. & G., 250; Johnson v.
Shrewsbury Railroad Company, 3 DeGex, M. & G., 914; Pickering v.
The Bishop of Ely, 2 Y. & C. C. C., 249; Lumley v. Wagner, I DeGex.

M. & G., 604.
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sought to be enforced by the strike is legal and where it is
illegal, and while he admits 'that a strike to accomplish a
boycott be an illegal and indictable offense, clearly disclaims
for the court of equity any power-to restrafn an employee
from leaving a road either to accomplish a legal or illegal
purpose.
But suppose this last and conservative position of
Judge TAFT to be the wise one for the present, how long
will it remain so? As a result of his position, a railroad
'employee acting in concert to enforce a boycott as well
as for a legal purpose can leave a road practically without
a moment's notice. The power of the empl9yees to effect
* irreparable -damage ,.to property is thus as strong as'ever.
If we are not mistaken, -however, the courts will use
this decision, as also that of Judge RicKs, to develop, as.
necessity arises, the doctrine that the employees of a large
transportation company, in their relations to their employer
* have not that same freedom of staLy or go_ as a mans
servants, and vice versa-for it is ,a rule which works
'both ways, that an employer, i. e., the directors of a laige
transportation company, in relation, to their employees
have not the same freedom of discharge and hire as a man
has with his servants. This is not asserting that the
that any
doctrine will ever be successfully maintained
work, or any employ& a
employee has a vested right to
vested right to a.man's work. But it is beginning to be
generally understood that the State has an interest in the
continuation of the relations of employer and employed in
specific instances, and thus where the sudden determination
of such a relation also, as is invariably the case, inflicts an
irreparable injury on specific property, the 'Qurts will be
prone to grant the owner an injunction.. The fact that
there is an injury to the public, theoretically has nothing
to do with- the issuing of such an injunction, and at one
time might have even formed an objection, but it will
practically act as a powerful lever to induce the judges to
issue such injunctions, just as it is evident in the present
cases that the wrong to the community at large was a power-
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